Results tagged “Constitutional Law”

By Associate Professor Kevin Lapp

On December 6, 2012, California Attorney General Kamala Harris declared that local law enforcement agencies in the state are free to decide whether they will comply with immigration detainers issued by the federal government. This was a big announcement for at least two reasons: (1) immigration detainers are a key component of immigration enforcement programs such as Secure Communities, which ostensibly target for deportation non-citizens who have committed serious crimes, and (2) California is the nation's most populous state, with the largest non-citizen population and the nation's largest criminal justice system.

An immigration detainer is a piece of paper from immigration officials purporting to command a jailor to hold a specific individual for up to 48 hours after the individual would otherwise have been released. The purpose behind the extra detention is to allow Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) to evaluate the detainee's immigration status or take the individual into custody itself. Since 2009, the United States has issued approximately 250,000 immigration detainers a year.

State and local law enforcement officials across the country regularly comply with immigration detainers, holding individuals at their own cost until ICE takes them into custody or releases the hold. Some believe that compliance is mandatory, as a glance at the form would suggest. Near the top, it states in bold and all caps, "MAINTAIN CUSTODY OF ALIEN FOR A PERIOD NOT TO EXCEED 48 HOURS." Later, the form quotes from a regulation, 8 C.F.R. 287.7, that the law enforcement agency "shall maintain custody of an alien" once DHS issues a detainer.

But there has been a growing trend against compliance. Santa Clara and San Francisco County (as well as Chicago, Washington, D.C. and New York City) have chosen not to honor at least some immigration detainers. These localities have taken AG Harris's position that the detainers are requests, not commands. They have also objected to the fact that the states and localities must bear the cost of the extended detention, often for individuals arrested for petty offenses who pose no risk to the community.

In the last two months, Los Angeles County has gone from an area of total compliance to limited compliance. In October, Los Angeles Police Department Chief Charlie Beck said that his department (the nation's second largest) would soon refuse to honor certain immigration detainers. Chief Beck made it clear that his decision was a reaction to the federal government's heavy-handed approach toward non-citizens, which despite claims to the contrary, targets both dangerous criminals and those suspected of petty offenses. In California, for example, more than half of the people deported pursuant to Secure Communities since 2009 had no criminal history or only misdemeanor convictions. Chief Beck also linked this concern to public safety, asserting that "we need to build trust in [Hispanic] communities and we need to build cooperation." Beck's plan is to refuse immigration detainers for those arrested for certain non-violent misdemeanors (the plan must be approved by a civilian board before it goes into effect).

By Professor Doug NeJaime

The U.S. Supreme Court has decided to hear two cases implicating marriage for same-sex couples. The first, United States v. Windsor, raises the question of whether Section 3 of the federal Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA), which denies federal recognition to same-sex couples' marriages, is unconstitutional. The second, Hollingsworth v. Perry, involves the constitutionality of California's Proposition 8, the state constitutional amendment banning marriage for same-sex couples. That the Court has taken these two cases suggests that it may approach the significant issue raised by the Second Circuit in Windsor -- but avoided by the Ninth Circuit in Perry -- regarding the level of scrutiny to be afforded sexual orientation classifications for equal protection purposes. If sexual orientation classifications merit heightened scrutiny, as the Second Circuit held, all laws that discriminate against lesbians and gay men -- including state marriage prohibitions -- would be suspect. Of course, the combination of Windsor and Perry also suggests that some Justices may believe there is a material distinction between a federal law denying recognition to same-sex couples' valid state-law marriages and a state law preventing same-sex couples from marrying. In other words, the Supreme Court may, on one hand, be poised to issue definitive rulings in favor of sexual orientation equality or, on the other hand, be prepared to split the difference. At the same time, the Supreme Court could simply approach both issues by employing the lowest level of constitutional scrutiny and yet still find both the federal and state laws unconstitutional.

Professor NeJaime recently wrote about the possible Supreme Court review of same-sex marriage laws on Jurist.

By Professor Brietta Clark

Since election night people have been preoccupied with what the post-election polling reveals about America's electorate, particularly its shifting values and priorities and what this will mean for future elections. A recurring theme among commentators is that growing diversity played an important role for Democratic wins in the Presidential and Congressional races. According to a report by the Pew Research Center, Obama received the support of African Americans, Latinos, and Asian Americans by a wide margin. Women also played a prominent role in this election: they not only supported Obama by a wide margin, but were also instrumental in Democratic wins in the House and Senate. And a Gallup survey showed that voters who identify as gay, lesbian, or bisexual overwhelmingly supported President Obama.

Read the complete post on Professor Clark's Health Care Justice Blog.

By Associate Professor Doug NeJaime

On November 7, 2012, voters in Maine, Maryland, and Washington became the first in the country to approve same-sex marriage at the ballot box, ending a long-running streak of popular votes against marriage equality. On the same day, voters in Minnesota rejected a constitutional amendment that would have prohibited marriage for same-sex couples — something California voters failed to do four years ago. Now that the popular vote has swung the other way, it is not simply the political calculus that has changed but the legal landscape as well. For opponents of same-sex marriage, their streak at the ballot box has supported their arguments against judicial intervention in favor of marriage equality. With these recent results, it becomes increasingly difficult to paint the judiciary — and the US Supreme Court in particular — as an overreaching, out-of-touch institution on the question of same-sex marriage. This new dynamic comes just as the Supreme Court prepares to consider the issue. The Court will soon announce whether it will review cases striking down the federal Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA) and California's Proposition 8.

The entire piece is available on Jurist's Forum. Read the complete piece.

By Associate Professor Aaron Caplan

Barack Obama's election -- and now re-election -- signal America's willingness to select as its leader a member of a historically reviled minority group. The group I refer to, of course, is constitutional law professors.

The President's familiarity with America's constitutional history crept into his Tuesday night victory speech, but perhaps at a frequency that only dogs or fellow con law professors could hear. Consciously or unconsciously, he echoed sentiments from a case studied in most First Amendment courses, Terminiello v. City of Chicago (1949). Terminiello was one of a series of important decisions involving civil rights and freedom of speech that arose from Chicago's tumultuous racial and ethnic tensions of the mid-20th century. As a proud Chicagoan, President Obama would certainly be familiar with this line of cases, which also includes Hansberry v. Lee (1940) (segregated housing), Beauharnais v. Illinois (1952) (hate speech), Gregory v. Chicago (1969) (civil rights demonstration), Organization for a Better Austin v. Keefe (1971) (protests relating to segregated housing), and Collin v. Smith (1978) (neo-Nazi parade).

In Terminiello, an angry crowd demonstrated outside an auditorium where a demagogue delivered a reactionary and anti-Semitic political speech. To avoid a riot, police arrested the speaker for disorderly conduct. At trial, the jury was instructed that a defendant's behavior "may constitute a breach of the peace if it stirs the public to anger, invites dispute, brings about a condition of unrest, or creates a disturbance, or if it molests the inhabitants in the enjoyment of peace and quiet by arousing alarm."

The Supreme Court reversed the conviction. In its most widely-quoted passage, Justice William O. Douglas's majority opinion relied on a bit of verbal jujitsu to declare that the vices identified in the jury instructions were actually virtues: "[A] function of free speech under our system of government is to invite dispute. It may indeed best serve its high purpose when it induces a condition of unrest, creates dissatisfaction with conditions as they are, or even stirs people to anger."

Justice Douglas's opinion in Terminiello echoed in this passage of the President's victory speech in Chicago:

Democracy in a nation of 300 million can be noisy and messy and complicated. We have our own opinions. Each of us has deeply held beliefs. And when we go through tough times, when we make big decisions as a country, it necessarily stirs passions, stirs up controversy. That won't change after tonight, and it shouldn't. These arguments we have are a mark of our liberty.

By Associate Professor Doug NeJaime

On November 6, voters in Maine, Maryland, and Washington will decide whether to allow same-sex couples to marry. In 2010, Maine voters repealed the marriage equality law that lawmakers had passed and the governor had signed. This time Mainers will be the first in the country to affirmatively vote on same-sex marriage. In Maryland and Washington, voters are being asked whether to approve or reject the marriage equality laws state lawmakers passed earlier this year. In all three states, recent polls suggest that marriage equality may win.

Of course, this would mark a game-changing moment in the political battle for same-sex marriage. But it would also significantly impact the legal battle raging in the courts. Currently, the U.S. Supreme Court is considering whether to weigh in on both the federal Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA) and California's Proposition 8, the state constitutional ban on same-sex marriage. Advocates at the leading LGBT legal organizations warned against the federal challenge to Proposition 8, worried about its uncertain fate at the Court. Throughout the litigation, they have worked - along with the City and County of San Francisco and prominent constitutional law professors - to frame the case as one about the unique situation in California. The Ninth Circuit agreed, finding that California, which allowed same-sex couples to marry before taking that right away and which provides a comprehensive domestic partnership system with the state-law rights and benefits of marriage for same-sex couples, did not have a legitimate interest in restricting marriage. Under the Ninth Circuit's holding, determinations regarding the constitutionality of other states' marriage bans require additional litigation. LGBT movement advocates, therefore, are hoping the Justices will pass on the invitation to review the Ninth Circuit's decision.

By Associate Professor Aaron Caplan

Every year, my constitutional law students study Personnel Administrator of Massachusetts v. Feeney (1979), which involved a Massachusetts program giving veterans an employment preference when applying for state jobs. Since at that time veterans were overwhelmingly male, the law effectively locked females out of state jobs. The U.S. Supreme Court upheld the program, explaining that the state would not be discriminating by enacting a law that disporportionately harmed women -- unless the state chose that law "because of," and not merely "in spite of" its disparate impact.

I do not know whether Massachusetts still has a veterans preference, but according to presidential candidate Mitt Romney, he did his part to find state employment for women while he was governor of that state. As he told the story during the Oct. 16 debate:

As I was serving as governor of my state ... I had the chance to pull together a cabinet and all the applicants seemed to be men.

And I went to my staff, and I said, “How come all the people for these jobs are all men?” They said, “Well, these are the people that have the qualifications.” And I said, “Well, gosh, can’t we find some women that are also qualified?”

And we took a concerted effort to go out and find women who had backgrounds that could be qualified to become members of our cabinet.

I went to a number of women’s groups and said, “Can you help us find folks,” and they brought us whole binders full of women.

I was proud of the fact that after I staffed my Cabinet and my senior staff, that the University of New York in Albany did a survey of all 50 states, and concluded that mine had more women in senior leadership positions than any other state in America.

Now one of the reasons I was able to get so many good women to be part of that team was because of our recruiting effort. But number two, because I recognized that if you’re going to have women in the workforce that sometimes you need to be more flexible. My chief of staff, for instance, had two kids that were still in school. She said, I can’t be here until 7 or 8 o’clock at night. I need to be able to get home at 5 o’clock so I can be there for making dinner for my kids and being with them when they get home from school. So we said fine. Let’s have a flexible schedule so you can have hours that work for you.

According to the Boston Phoenix, women's groups assembled the resumes of qualified women in advance of the election, so Governor Romney may not have instigated the idea as he described. But as an article on Slate points out, Romney at least took the trouble to look through the binders, and hired quite a few women from those resumes.

There's a name for what Governor Romney described in the debate: affirmative action. An all-male list of finalists may signal something faulty about your search. Absence of women on the list of qualified applicants may tell you more about your assumptions about job qualifications than tells you about the capabilities of women. The obligation to reconsider institutional arrangements goes beyond the recruitment phase. The nature of workplace may need to change so that nontraditional workers can succeed once they are hired. Most of my students think this sounds pretty good. And a presidential nominee would not be boasting about his history of affirmative action it unless he thought it would generate mainstream support.

Professor Kimberly West-Faulcon submitted an amicus curiae brief on behalf of the respondents in Fisher v. Univ. of TX at Austin.

In it, she wrote:

This brief explains how social science research undermines the common misconception that black applicants must be receiving "preferential" treatment and that the magnitude of the so-called "preference" is large on the basis of a casual numerical comparison of the average test scores of black admits as compared to white admits. It also explains that "the gap" in black-white group average scores on traditional mental tests, while still in existence, has been narrowing for several decades. The brief describes the relevance of contemporary research finding that theoretically-improved and updated versions of such tests have been shown to narrow the black-white average score gap presumably because they are based on more theoretically robust and more outcome predictive theories of intelligence. Such research calls into question petitioner's allegation that UT's minimal consideration of race as a factor in admissions violates her Fourteenth Amendment constitutional rights because she is Caucasian.

Read the complete brief.

Laurie Levenson, Professor of Law, William M. Rains Fellow and David W. Burcham Chair in Ethical Advocacy, wrote the following article titled, "Supreme Court's Rulings on Ineffective Assistance at Plea Bargaining Stage Call for New Efforts by Not Only Defense Counsel but Also Prosecutors and Judges," that was published in Bloomberg's Criminal Law Reporter on Wed. April 25, 2012.

"It is a big year for U.S. Supreme Court cases. Health care, affirmative action, GPS devices, stripsearches--the court selected many of the hot-button issues to decide this term. Among the most important cases are Missouri v. Frye, 2012 BL 67235 (U.S. 3/21/2012), and Lafler v. Cooper, BL 67236 (U.S. 3/21/2012). In these opinions, the court recognized that plea bargaining lies at the heart of the way that the current criminal justice system operates. Thus, the court's decision to set standards for defense counsel's assistance during plea bargaining has the potential to dramatically affect how plea bargaining is handled in this country."

Read the full article.

In a new essay, Constitutional Change, Courts, and Social Movements, to be published in the Michigan Law Review, Professor Doug NeJaime reviews Jack Balkin's influential new book, Constitutional Redemption: Political Faith in an Unjust World (Harvard University Press 2011). Balkin is the Knight Professor of Constitutional Law at Yale Law School and is one of the most influential constitutional scholars in the country. In the review, NeJaime argues that by situating courts as important actors in the process of constitutional and social change, Balkin's analysis redeems courts in a field - constitutional theory - that has largely turned away from courts as undemocratic, incapable, and inherently conservative. Ultimately, NeJaime takes his work on law and social movements to Balkin's account of constitutional change, arguing that attention to the way in which social movement lawyers deploy court-based tactics suggests that Balkin's account of courts is more realistic than the pessimistic accounts that have dominated constitutional scholarship recently. While Balkin focuses on social movements' relationship to courts, he does not borrow explicitly from the extensive literature on social movements in sociology. Accordingly, NeJaime suggests a research agenda that uses the theoretical frameworks and empirical insights from social movement theory to develop a more dynamic, context-specific, and contingent account of courts in the process of social change. In the end, NeJaime argues, social movement theory would help constitutional scholars specify both the possibilities and limitations of courts and court-centered tactics.

By Professor Brietta Clark

[Recently], the U.S. Supreme Court issued an odd decision in the case of Douglas v. Independent Living Center. Douglas is the consolidation of three suits challenging cuts in California's Medicaid (Medi-Cal) reimbursement for a wide range of health care services. The Ninth Circuit affirmed lower court decisions halting the cuts because they were found to violate a provision of the Medicaid Act that requires rates be sufficient to ensure equal access to quality care. This provision, 42 USC 1396a(a)(30(A), is commonly known as the "Equal Access" or "30A" Requirement. The Supreme Court did not take up the issue of whether the cuts actually violated this requirement.

Read the complete piece on Professor Brietta Clark's Health Care Justice Blog.

By Associate Professor Aaron Caplan

When can the government punish liars? The question is being debated today in the Supreme Court, as it hears oral arguments in United States v. Alvarez. In this case from Southern California, the defendant said during a public meeting that he had received the Congressional Medal of Honor. He hadn't. The government prosecuted under the Stolen Valor Act of 2005, which makes it a federal crime for any person to "falsely represent himself or herself, verbally or in writing, to have been awarded any [military] decoration or medal" -- even if no medals or related documents are counterfeited, and even if no one is financially harmed or suffers other personal injuries as a result of the false statement. It would be constitutionally acceptable for the government to prosecute someone who told this or any other lie as part of a scheme to defraud others. But in this case, the defendant's bogus boasts were not used to cheat anyone, but only to scratch some inner itch within his own personality. As it happens, his lies were quickly and publicly exposed, and he was ostracized by his community. Alvarez's behavior was certainly undesirable, but may he be sent to prison simply because society considers his lies morally objectionable?

I previously wrote about Alvarez for the American Constitution Society blog in 2010 when the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit ruled 2-1 that the law was unconstitutional. Last fall, I asked nine students in my First Amendment class to sit as their own Supreme Court, applying existing free speech precedents to this novel situation. As a teacher, I was hoping that the class would be evenly divided to allow a lively classroom debate. There was plenty of debate, but in the end my justices reached a strong majority position -- by an 8 to 1 margin -- that the law was unconstitutional. They reasoned that the Stolen Valor Act punishes speech that does not fall into any of the narrowly defined categories of less-protected speech where the government is allowed to punish based on content. False statements that are part of a scheme to defraud are one proscribable category. False statements that damage another person's reputation (defamatory speech) are another. But my students overwhelmingly rejected the idea that these and similar categories were merely examples of a broader category of false statements in general. These students saw a great danger in allowing the government to decide what counts as the truth, unless such a judgment is required to redress an identifiable harm to others that the speech caused. Governmental action against speech is not justified merely because the speech is offensive to many (or most) people. They noted the historically-proven risk that such laws could be used against the government's political opponents, and argued that the truthfulness of Alvarez's speech should be judged in the marketplace of ideas -- which it was -- and not in a criminal courtroom.

A few months after our in-class exercise, the Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit issued a 3-0 decision in United States v. Strandlof that disagreed with the Ninth Circuit decision in Alvarez. My dissenting student was elated that his position was now supported by four out of the six federal appeals court judges who had considered the case. We will learn later this year whether the U.S. Supreme Court will dare to disagree with the collective judgment of a majority of my Loyola students.

Associate Professor Douglas NeJaime has followed the Proposition 8 legal battle closely. His early assessment of the Ninth Circuit's decision is below:

In a 2-1 decision, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals ruled that Proposition 8, the California constitutional amendment that eliminated the right to marry for same-sex couples, violates the federal Constitution. Writing for the court, Judge Reinhardt decided the case in the most narrow fashion available, basing his holding on the unique situation in California. The state maintains an entirely separate system for same-sex couples (domestic partnership) and provides all the same state-law rights and benefits of marriage through that system. In addition, unlike in other states, same-sex couples enjoyed the right to marry in California and had that right withdrawn by Proposition 8. Based on these unique facts, the court concluded that Proposition 8 fails to meet even the lowest level of scrutiny under the federal Equal Protection Clause. By ruling in a narrow fashion and basing its holding on the reasoning of Romer v. Evans (the U.S. Supreme Court decision striking down Colorado's Amendment 2, which withdrew and prohibited antidiscrimination protections for lesbians and gay men), the Ninth Circuit decided the case in a way that would allow the Supreme Court to affirm without having to significantly expand on its existing jurisprudence and without having to rule on marriage for same-sex couples on a national scale. In effect, the Ninth Circuit's decision allows the Supreme Court to continue the incremental, case-by-case trajectory of marriage for same-sex couples in the United States.

I am pleased to announce that the Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review has just released its inaugural Supreme Court issue.

This issue is dedicated to Justice Stevens and includes letters from President Bill Clinton, Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg and Justice Sonia Sotomayor, as well as letters and essays written by Justice Stevens' former clerks Susan R. Estrich, Michael J. Gottlieb, Abner S. Greene, Jamal Greene, Melissa Hart, Amanda Leiter, Gregory P. Magarian, Nancy S. Marder, David Pozen, Adam M. Samaha and Samuel Spital.

The inaugural foreword was contributed by Erwin Chemerinsky, and Bill Araiza and Matt Vega also wrote articles. Numerous Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review editors wrote case comments for this issue. We are proud of the contribution we believe this volume will make. If you would like a copy, please let me know.

--Professor Michael Waterstone, associate dean for research and academic centers

By Associate Clinical Professor Maureen Pacheco, assistant director of Loyola's Center for Juvenile Law and Policy

In People v. Caballero, the California Supreme Court will soon be determining whether a 16-year-old boy with schizophrenia may be sentenced to 110-years-to life for three counts of attempted murder. Rodrigo Caballero would not be eligible for parole until 2212, when he would be 122 years old. Advocates from around the country joined in an amicus brief filed on October 28, 2011, urging the Court to find that this "functional equivalent" of life without parole is precisely the sentence prohibited by Graham v. Florida (2010) 130 S. Ct. 2011. In Graham, the United States Supreme Court ruled that juvenile offenders cannot be sentenced to life without a meaningful and realistic opportunity for re-entry into society prior to the expiration of their sentence for non-homicide offenses. As Justice Kennedy wrote so eloquently,

The juvenile should not be deprived of the opportunity to achieve maturity of judgment and self-recognition of human worth and potential. . . . Life in prison without the possibility of parole gives no chance for fulfillment outside prison walls, no chance for reconciliation with society, no hope.

Loyola Law School and the Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review hosted a daylong discussion of the most pressing issues facing the gay, lesbian and transgender community during the symposium "LGBT Identity and the Law" on Friday, Oct. 21 on Loyola's downtown L.A. campus. Antidiscrimination, constitutional culture, healthcare and family issues will be the focus of four panel discussions. The keynote speaker was Dr. Gary Gates, Williams Distinguished Scholar, The Williams Institute, UCLA School of Law.

"Speakers addressed how sexual orientation issues are shaping constitutional law and politics, how antidiscrimination law both protects and fails to protect sexual minorities, how issues around healthcare access and medical care shape the lives of transgender and intersex individuals, and how the law recognizes and regulates families headed by same-sex couples," said Associate Professor Doug NeJaime, an organizer and moderator of the symposium. "Not only did the panelists chart the trajectory of the LGBT rights movement, they provided fresh commentary and presented new research on current and emerging issues that will shape the future of LGBT rights litigation, policy work and scholarship."

SCHEDULE

8:45-9:00 A.M. | WELCOME
Victor J. Gold, Fritz B. Burns Dean and Professor of Law, Loyola Law School; Senior Vice President, Loyola Marymount University

9:00-10:30 A.M. | PANEL ONE: ANTIDISCRIMINATION

Moderator: James Gilliam, Deputy Executive Director, ACLU of Southern California; Adjunct Professor, Loyola Law School

Cary Franklin, Assistant Professor of Law, University of Texas at Austin School of Law

Holning Lau, Associate Professor of Law, University of North Carolina School of Law

Jennifer Pizer, Legal Director and Arnold D. Kassoy Senior Scholar of Law, The Williams Institute, UCLA School of Law

Cliff Rosky, Associate Professor of Law, University of Utah S.J. Quinney College of Law

10:30-10:45 A.M. | BREAK

10:45 A.M-12:15 P.M. | PANEL TWO: CONSTITUTIONAL CULTURE

Moderator: Douglas NeJaime, Associate Professor of Law, Loyola Law School

Dale Carpenter, Earl R. Larson Professor of Civil Rights and Civil Liberties Law, University of Minnesota Law School

Jon Davidson, Legal Director, Lambda Legal

Julie Nice, Herbst Foundation Professor of Law, University of San Francisco School of Law

12:15-1:45 P.M. | LUNCH

Keynote: Dr. Gary Gates, Williams Distinguished Scholar, The Williams Institute, UCLA School of Law

1:45-3:15 P.M. | PANEL THREE: HEALTHCARE

Moderator: Brietta Clark, Professor of Law, Loyola Law School

Julie Greenberg, Professor of Law, Thomas Jefferson School of Law

Ilan Meyer, Ph.D., Williams Senior Scholar for Public Policy, The Williams Institute, UCLA School of Law

Katie Pratt, Professor of Law, Loyola Law School

Brad Sears, Executive Director and Roberta A. Conroy Scholar of Law and Policy, The Williams Institute, UCLA School of Law

3:15-3:30 P.M. | BREAK

3:30-5:00 P.M. | PANEL FOUR: LGBT FAMILIES

Moderator: Jennifer Rothman, Professor of Law and Joseph Scott Fellow, Loyola Law School

Courtney Joslin, Acting Professor of Law, UC Davis School of Law

Melissa Murray, Professor of Law, Berkeley Law

Nancy Polikoff, Professor of Law, American University Washington College of Law; McDonald/Wright Visiting Chair of Law and Faculty Chair, The Williams Institute, UCLA School of Law

Associate Professor Doug NeJaime is participating in the Constitutional Redemption symposium, a dialogue on Jack Balkin's new book. Other participants include Jack Balkin (Yale), Melissa Murray (Berkeley), Bernadette Meyler (Cornell), Emily Zackin (Princeton), Joe Fishkin (Texas), Dan Solove (GW), Andrew Coan (Wisconsin) and Josh Chafetz (Cornell). The Concurring Opinions event is viewable online. Below is Professor NeJaime's opening post.

Jack Balkin's Constitutional Redemption: A Much-Needed Dose of Optimism

I want to thank Danielle Citron for inviting me to participate in this symposium. And I want to thank Jack Balkin for giving me the great honor of commenting on his wonderful book. In Constitutional Redemption, Balkin offers an important, insightful, and useful corrective to the pessimism that pervades a significant amount of legal scholarship on the left. His constitutional optimism suggests the potential and possibilities of constitutional mobilization.

Balkin's book offers incredible amounts of rich material. He provides a descriptive account of constitutional change, a normative vision of democratic culture, and an interpretative theory aimed at fulfilling the Constitution's promises. In showing how social movements believe in and agitate for constitutional redemption, Balkin redeems the Constitution for legal scholarship, reminding us that the Constitution serves both as a potent symbol of social change and as a vehicle for continued reform. In this commentary, I first want to focus on why I think Balkin's descriptive account is accurate by pointing to two essential moves I see him making. I then want to show Balkin's theory in action in the marriage equality context as a way to translate his analysis into a useful lesson for liberals and progressives.

Associate Professor Doug NeJaime recently published an op-ed, "Same-sex marriage: Married but unequal," in the Los Angeles Times.

On Sunday, New York will begin issuing marriage licenses to gay and lesbian couples, further complicating the tangled legal mess of same-sex marriage in America.

Why does this complicate things? Consider what happens when legally married couples from New York move to, say, California. They'll see their marriages evaporate, based only on their sexual orientation.

Read the complete op-ed.

California State Sen. Loni Hancock introduced legislationthis week banning the death penalty in California in part because of information contained in the "Executing the Will of the Voters?: A Roadmap to Mend or End the California Legislature's Multi-billion-dollar Death Penalty Debacle," a recently circulated law review article set to appear in a forthcoming edition of the Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review. It was written by Judge Arthur L. Alarcón, senior judge, U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, and Paula M. Mitchell, an adjunct professor at Loyola Law School. Mitchell, a 2002 alumna of the Law School, is a cler to Alarcón.

By Associate Professor Aaron Caplan

On June 23, 2011, the U.S. Supreme Court issued its 6-3 decision in Sorrell v. IMS Health, Inc. I previously wrote about the case here. In the new decision, the Court invalidated a Vermont law that prohibited the sale and use for marketing purposes of pharmacy records that reveal doctors' drug prescribing practices without the doctors' permission. The Court viewed Vermont's law as a ham-handed attack on a particular type of commercial speech, so its ordinarily laudable free speech impulses kicked in. However, it failed to recognize the legitimacy of protecting informational privacy as a governmental goal, and indeed doubted that the law would even advance doctors' privacy. This surely comes as a surprise to doctors, who now find that data brokers have a constitutional right, at least in some settings, to buy and sell their information for commercial gain without their knowledge or consent.

The Court's decision contains mostly bad news for those who value individual control over the commodification of personal information. However, it leaves open the possibility that the real flaw in Vermont's law was not that it attempted to protect too much privacy, but that it protected too little.

THE BAD NEWS.

1. The Court revealed little understanding of why violations of informational privacy are troublesome. Evidence at trial showed that many doctors felt violated when they learned that pharmacies were selling information about the doctors' prescriptions to drug manufacturers behind their backs, alarmed that the manufacturers were secretly using the information to manipulate them during visits by pharmaceutical representatives, and outraged that the records could be used as a back-door method of determining their confidential and privileged advice to their patients. The biggest harm to privacy was not, as the Court seemed to think, that a pushy sales representative might come to a doctor's office. The harm was that doctors reasonably felt that their lives and livelihoods were under surveillance for the benefit of others. Overall, the Court showed little enthusiasm for informational privacy as a desirable component of a good society, and no recognition at all that it is a value of constitutional stature.